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An embedded ideology of the religious-secular binary in its various forms 
has assumed currency in recent continental and Anglo-American political 
thought. This ideology highlights the difference between religion under 
modernization, broadly defined by the secularization thesis, and that of 
religious revival in a period characterized by postsecularism. It reflects the 
rise of new epistemologies and the dissolution of the antinomies between 
faith and reason characteristic of a postsecular culture. A common argu-
ment found in these writings is that enlightenment secularization, which 
relegates the sacred to a private sphere, seems to have discovered its own 
parochialism as religion continues to provide meaning in all aspects of 
contemporary social and political life.
At the center of the recent contested cluster of ideas on postsecularism 
are the works of Jürgen Habermas, which have played a pivotal role in the 
renewed attention to religion beginning in the 1980s. Earlier, Habermas 
saw religion as irrelevant to the revitalization of a democratically engaged 
public sphere.1 His new regard for religion, articulated across several ven-
ues since 2001, has led him to embrace the term “postsecular society” in 
order to demarcate the current moment: as a crucial stage in the histori-
cal development of the failure of secularism and as a fruitful ground in 
the cultivation of new forms of understanding religiosity.2 He argues that 
1. See Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An 
Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1992).
2. Jürgen Habermas, An Awareness of What Is Missing: Faith and Reason in a Post-
Secular Age, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge: Polity, 2011), pp. 15–23.
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“practical reason fails to fulfill its own vocation, when it no longer has 
sufficient strength to awaken, and to keep awake in the minds of secular 
subjects, an awareness of the violations of solidarity throughout the world, 
an awareness of what is missing, of what cries out to heaven.”3
I also examine Gandhi’s approach to religion for three reasons. First, 
experts lament that there is no such thing as Indian political thought or 
that it seems to play no role in the way the social sciences are practiced.4 
The problem is that many terms Gandhi employed—shakti (energy), 
satya (truth), atman (soul), dharma (right/duty)—to reflect on the Indian 
experience are not used in contemporary Western political theory. Despite 
these contestations there is a need to understand the distinctive tradition of 
social and political thought that fashions and sustains some of the political 
practices of Indian democracy today. As India becomes a global power, 
the neglect of Indian political thought is striking and serious. Those who 
are interested in understanding the nature of this transformation can profit 
from the way the concepts of the essential unity of humankind and of the 
philosophical ties that bind different religions have been held by seminal 
thinkers of modern India.
Clearly while the attempt is to move beyond the limited universality 
traditionally claimed by the Western canon, the need to reclaim the mean-
ing of secularism in contemporary politics is important, as what constitutes 
religion and what constitutes the secular has been a bone of contention in 
public discourse in India for many decades. Since the partition of India, 
the state has seen separation of religion from secular domains to disarm 
fanaticism, to accommodate different and potentially conflicting identi-
ties, and to create a democratic state. The discourse on secularism has 
evolved to a point where it would be hubristic to attempt to write its entire 
role in a democratic vision for India. Consequently, this study is organized 
around some concepts related to secularism that have been pivotal in a 
paradigmatic transformation of the Indian polity, as in recent years the 
relation between political and religious domains takes on new meaning 
and new urgency as scholars review the attacks on the secular tradition in 
India.5
3. Ibid., p. 19.
4. Norman D. Palmer, “Indian and Western Political Thought: Coalescence or Clash?” 
The American Political Science Review 49, no. 3 (1955): 747–61. See also Sheldon Pol-
lock, “Crisis in the Classics,” Social Research 78, no. 1 (2001): 21–48.
5. See Anuradha D. Needham and Rajeshwari S. Rajan, eds., The Crisis of Secular-
ism in India (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2007).
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Another reason for paying heed to Gandhi’s work is that there are 
interesting parallels and divergences between Habermas’s discourse mode 
of settling the claims of contested religions and Gandhi’s approach to 
the pursuit of moral truths. Despite these similarities, not many scholars 
have studied them together. This may be due to their different historical 
contexts, conceptual frameworks, and uses of terminology. This study is 
written with a view to bridge a divide between modern European criti-
cal theory and non-Western critical theoretical projects whose central 
aim is to rethink the premises of secularism.6 Habermas is defending a 
space for religious traditions at a time when nation states have declined 
but individual freedoms, basic rights of citizenship, and a certain religious 
homogenization has already been established in European societies. His 
inquiry is guided by the asymmetrical distribution of the burdens of citi-
zenship in contemporary Europe. He realizes there can be no integration 
of plural religious traditions without a readiness to tolerate the spectrum of 
thoughts and cultures of immigrant populations, because religious beliefs 
inform political choices and these often clash.
Gandhi is writing in a colonial context where individual rights and 
opportunities are limited or overridden, in which although sensitivity for 
minority rights is manifested in constitutional proceedings, the urge to mold 
minorities into a desired homogenous cultural shape is very prominent 
during formation of the nation state. Later, as separate political representa-
tion is withdrawn for minorities, cultural safeguards through institutions 
(language, culture and religious practices) is provided for the crucial sus-
tenance and survival of religious traditions in India. I try to establish some 
common ground in their approaches, analyses, and strategies in resolving 
crisis of their particular age, so that their divergent positions actually inter-
lock on several methodological issues.
I begin by identifying three core arguments in Habermas’s recent 
work, where he stipulates that post-metaphysical thinking remains secular 
even in a situation depicted as “postsecular” but in this different situation 
it may become aware of a secularistic self-misunderstanding. Observing 
that many scholars use the term postsecular, we need to ask some ques-
tions: Given the inherently amorphous nature of the term and the diversity 
of approaches, do we really know or agree about the term “postsecular”? 
6. For Ambedkar’s rejection of hegemonic views, see Shabnum Tejani, “Reflections 
on Category of Secularism in India: Gandhi, Ambedkar and the Ethics of Communal Rep-
resentation,” in Needham and Rajan, The Crisis of Secularism in India, pp. 44–64.
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What political forms do religion or beliefs assume in a network society 
that has contributed to loosening the links that once tied authority to a 
social body determined by territory? More specifically, how do modern 
states cope with the challenge of religious revivalism? How should we 
understand the phenomenon of the return of religion in the postmodern 
world? Can religious political movements be accommodated within the 
framework of modern liberal democracies, or do they represent a radical 
challenge to the system? These are among the troubling questions that 
have been raised by the “Revenge of God” on “modern man” in a post-
secular age.7
While the paper tries to address some of these questions in order to 
sharpen the arguments, it will briefly outline Gandhi’s framing of our pre-
dicament in some of his writings in which he interrogates both religion and 
politics. He introduces the idea of “sarva dharma sambhava” (goodwill) 
or equal respect for all religions to discuss secularism, which was quite 
unlike Nehru’s understanding of state secularism based on the principle of 
impartiality or separation of state from any one religion.8 While Habermas 
is a confirmed agnostic, Gandhi’s life was permeated with religion as he 
concluded: “Those who say that religion has nothing to do with politics do 
not know what religion means.”9 Yet political action that was religious had 
to be deeply ethical, and that meant belief in satyagraha (truth force) and 
non-violent civil disobedience. Rather than neutralize religion or separate 
it from other substantive goods, Gandhi aimed to prevent those goods 
from closing spaces for religion and attaining the foundational status to 
which they aspire.
My argument is that the notion of a postsecular society is an attempt to 
look for political-cultural resources instead for a rearticulated political ide-
ology to revitalize the democracy project. Habermas attempts to refigure 
democracy away from strictly procedural accounts of communication in 
order to provide the answer to the question of the meaning and motivation 
7. Gilles Keppel, The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity and 
Judaism in the Modern World, trans. Alan Braley (University Park: Pennsylvania State 
UP, 1994).
8. Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister, is seen as closer to a “weak” secu-
larism thesis that claims fair management of diverse religious views as opposed to the 
“strong” thesis that sees separation.
9. Mohandas K. Gandhi, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi (Government of 
India: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1961), 59:401.
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in modernity through intersubjectivity as a potential bond for democratic 
legitimacy. His criticisms of secularism arise because he is focusing on 
conceptions developed in largely homogenous societies with individuals 
who view themselves as right-bearing subjects of liberal democracies.
Writing in a different context on modernity, Gandhi also sets aside 
political ideologies when he attempts to translate the likeness of human 
beings to the image of the divine into the equal dignity of all human beings, 
which then offers a way of reorienting society’s values toward social trans-
formation. In “Hind Swaraj” he argues that adoption of either modernity 
or tradition has to enhance both the spiritual and material well-being of 
the individual and society. Does the acknowledgment of either a secularist 
misunderstanding or “sarva dharma sambhava” have the potential to be 
constitutive of a postsecular ethic suited to multi-ethnic and multi-religious 
societies worldwide? An exploration of these approaches and questions, I 
submit, would be a useful contribution to an understanding of the limits 
of postsecularism to reclaiming the political. What is lost in this revision-
ing, I will argue, is the idea of secularism as complex equality that claims 
individuals are discriminated against only because of their belonging to 
particular religious groups. As a form of resistance to uniformization and 
a call for democratization, secularism acquires significance in political 
narratives against authoritarianism. However, secularism cannot be the 
only “mantra” (incantation) for revisioning the post-political world. By 
interpreting politics as a means of pursuing private beliefs or religious 
practices, it has almost totally obscured the exalted pleasures of engag-
ing in public affairs. In the final section, I also argue Gandhi unwittingly 
erected the signposts to what would emerge as a much later theory on 
religion in the postcolonial state, despite his intention in his own times to 
liberate religion from its dependence on the state framework. This libera-
tion would lead much further down the road, to a kind of “secularization” 
of the state that redefines social justice in modern India.
An Awareness of What Is Missing
The term postsecular has gained currency in contemporary debates in 
sociology, political theory, and even theology, especially after Habermas’s 
essays on “Religion in the Public Sphere” (2006), “The Dialectics of 
Secularization” (2007), and “An Awareness of What Is Missing: Faith and 
Reason in a Post-Secular Age” (2011). In these texts and others he suggests 
that political theory move to a “post-secular self-understanding of society 
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as a whole in which the global dimension, role and impact of religion in a 
continually secularising environment must be reckoned with.”10
The body of argument and commentary that has grown around the 
notion of the postsecular is expanding rapidly, and indeed is already 
extensive, so in what follows I will sketch some of the main lines of the 
debate only. Now the idea of the postsecular has an empirical and norma-
tive aspect that is of great interest to us. In its empirical sense, it refers 
to social orders that have undergone processes of secularization over the 
course of the past two to three hundred years but in which religious world-
views still shape the identities of its inhabitants. It seems to imply a time 
when religious beliefs and practices ceased to command widespread fol-
lowing and retreated from their age-old presence in the public institutions 
and structures of societies but have now returned to a position of renewed 
public prominence. Habermas’s revisioning of postsecularism in terms of 
political plurality is directed against some of his earlier formulations, but 
for the purpose of my argument here I will raise only three aspects about 
the symbolic and cultural influences of religion in our societies today: 
defining postsecularism, the self-correction of secularism, and the relation 
between philosophy, religion, and democracy.
The first problem is that social scientists have a hard time conceptual-
izing and especially measuring secularization, something that is related to 
the secular.11 By extension it is challenging to assess whether or not secu-
larization has in fact occurred given that there is so much evidence for and 
against its sociological reality. If secularism is so highly contestable, how 
can we use it to understand contemporary politics? Habermas argues that 
postsecular society applies only to those affluent societies where people’s 
religious ties have steadily or rather quite dramatically lapsed since the 
mid-twentieth century. In my reading of Habermas, “postsecular” and 
“postsecularism” carry complicated set of meanings, so for the purpose of 
this paper I would like to single out his emphasis on why “neither citizens 
nor the liberal state should expect citizens to justify their political posi-
tions independently of their religious convictions or worldviews.”12
10. Jürgen Habermas, “Equal Treatment of Cultures and Limits of Postmodern Lib-
eralism,” Journal of Philosophy 13, no. 1 (2005): 6. See “Religion in the Public Sphere,” 
European Journal of Philosophy 14, no. 1 (2006); and Florian Schuller, ed., Dialectics of 
Secularization: On Reason and Religion (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006).
11. See José Casanova, Public Religions in Modern World (Chicago: Univ. of Chi-
cago Press, 1994).
12. Jürgen Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cam-
bridge: Polity, 2008), p. 128.
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One element of this contestation is the rise of faith identities in politi-
cal and social life, regarding which Habermas explains three important 
sociopolitical developments. First, the growing incidents of religiously 
motivated conflicts and acts of terrorism and the dissemination of news 
regarding these incidents by the mass media have contributed to the 
change of two perceptions: religion and religious communities have a 
persistent place in the secular West, and that processes of modernization 
will not lead to a progressive shrinkage of religion. Second, the influ-
ence of churches and religious organizations in the formation of public 
opinion and private morality on key issues (euthanasia, animal protec-
tion, climate change) has been increasing. Finally, the growing number 
of guest workers, refugees, and immigrants with their traditional values 
in a secular society highlights the challenge of pluralism and the painful 
process of transformation into postcolonial “immigrant societies.” In these 
changed sociopolitical circumstances, for Habermas, the need of the hour 
is for people with a changed consciousness to maintain a balance between 
the increasing religious presence in their lives and the secular social and 
political order.
To support Habermas we could argue that in their historical origin 
secular democratic states translate religious discourses in their own vocab-
ulary, so what is at stake here is the curious “difference” between religions 
under modernization and religious revival under postsecularism. As far as 
the conceptual innovation is concerned, the “difference” in postsecular-
ism seems to indicate a crisis in the foundationalist paradigm in Western 
political thought. What emerges in the fissures of the secularization thesis 
is a new horizon of postsecularism; the conceptual difference between 
secularism and postsecularism assumes the role of an indicator or a symp-
tom of an absent ground. This difference presents nothing other than an 
absence in the traditional idea of politics divided by political ideologies. I 
would argue that each intellectual tradition is open to an internal develop-
ment of its own approach toward modernity. Therefore it might be better 
to see the role of religion in the emergence of multiple modernities in 
Asia and Europe, which further invites us to rethink the presuppositions 
of a secularization thesis.13 A revisionist perspective for Habermas, then, 
compels us to view modernization as a geographically restricted deviation 
rather than the matrix for cultural developments worldwide.
13. For analytical clarity a distinction must be maintained between secularization and 
secularity, which I do not discuss due to the limited scope of the paper.
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One correlate of this endeavor is to rethink Habermas’s critique of 
a self-deception in the secularist understanding that sees itself as a natu-
ral adversary to religion. This brings us to the second point. Habermas’s 
political thinking gravitates around the need for modern philosophy to 
engage with religious traditions. Here his concern is less with the larger 
public institutions, or states, than with individuals in whom the secularist 
self-understanding suppresses cognitive traces left by monotheistic tradi-
tions. In this light, it is appropriate to reconsider how, for Habermas, the 
pre-political ethics of a secular democratic state are considered religious 
in origin. What we have is a claim about post-metaphysical thinking that, 
through self-reflexivity about its origins, has revealed the limitations of 
its own secularism. Part of that reconsideration must involve recovering 
the identity of actual traditions and their normative significance for the 
present.
Many of the cherished concepts of secular moral and political phi-
losophy are demystified articulations of Judeo-Christian tenets. For 
example, Christians invoke their biblical message that men are created 
in the image of God and the successful implementation of a peaceful and 
mutually respected secular society in the implementation of God’s design. 
Most significantly religion has to fulfill these because Habermas explains 
a version of the historical consequentialist argument for privatizing reli-
gion: religion ought to be relegated to the private realm in order to inhibit 
religious disagreement from escalating into religious strife. A related 
argument is that religion ought to be relegated to the private sphere in 
order to avoid disruption and disharmony. He claims that religion has to go 
through the translation process in order to be free of its inherent destruc-
tive potential and gain general acceptance. However much of this kind of 
Judeo-Christian thought that Habermas is relying upon associated women 
with an inferior nature of the flesh and men with the spirit, and espoused 
patriarchal views of sex inequality that have been questioned ever since.14
Now since Habermas’s revised orientation remains concerned about 
democracy, the threat posed by globalizing forces make the need to dis-
cover new political cultural resources for the democratic revitalization 
project very urgent. Hence he argues that religiously derived norms and 
ethical intuitions might help in pushing for a rearticulated global democ-
racy. Both the secular and religious need to re-examine themselves and 
14. See Susan F. Parsons, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Feminist Theology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002).
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their domains; the secular citizens have to recognize their historical roots 
in religious discourse and not presuppose that it is an archaic and obsolete 
ideology. They must also go through a self-reflective transcending of a 
secularist self-understanding of modernity.
In spite of Habermas’s fear that the interests of philosophy and reli-
gion are opposed, he believes that rich intellectual benefits are to be gained 
from sharing a public space with a reconstituted tradition. As it turns out 
this leads to a proposal for a postsecular public sphere. But how are uni-
versal principles for the public role of religion to be formulated in this 
new context? If “postsecular” signifies some kind of self-correction, does 
it therefore imply a more openly religious turn or direction of modernity? 
When Habermas mentions a derailing of modernization, he is implying 
that this modernity needs to be put back on its tracks; presumably a more 
emphatic dialogue with religion will put this train of modernization back 
on its rails so that it can move toward its essential destination.
The third problem emerges when a postsecular defense found in 
Habermas also acts as a post-metaphysical universalism, having dispensed 
with the illusions peculiar to theories of the West. In this regard he claims 
that “modern reason will learn to understand itself only when it clarifies 
its relation to a contemporary religious consciousness.”15 He reformulates 
the idea of reason without regard to three assumptions: that reason is able 
to provide grounds and is transparent to itself; that reason is undetermined 
by anything other than itself; and that reason can discover an objective 
standpoint external to history and culture. Habermas’s recent approach 
works with different presuppositions: rather than legislated by a solitary 
individual who can arrive autonomously at a moral point of view, reason 
develops through the interactions with religious discourses.
The perplexing quality of this approach is overcome with a certain 
amount of revisions. In particular he emphasizes the need to come to terms 
with the idea of a world in which philosophy and religion must live side 
by side in the public culture. A rethinking of secularism must make room 
for religion. Of greatest importance are those criteria that religion has to 
meet in the translation process: (1) religious consciousness must come to 
terms with the cognitive dissonance of encountering other denominations 
and religions; (2) it must adapt to the authority of the sciences, which hold 
a monopoly of secular knowledge; (3) it must agree to the premises of a 
constitutional state. Thus Habermas’s revised orientation entails loosening 
15. Habermas, An Awareness of What Is Missing, pp. 17–18.
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philosophy’s relationship to the rationalist tradition so that secular thinking 
and religious consciousness can both engage in the postsecular condition.
As controversial as Habermas’s project may prove to be, it promises 
for many to recognize the public relevance of religion and of religious 
ideas in informing civic discourse in liberal democracies. His arguments 
for defending an expanded space for religious language in the public 
sphere go beyond the procedural point that it would be unfair to exclude 
religious worldviews and the citizens who have them.
For Habermas, the current sociological condition is one in which 
post-metaphysical thinking as the retrospective faculty of culling meaning 
from the past is a source of illumination. What is unclear is how far this 
condition, or the revival of religion, can be seen as catalyzed by social 
developments and how much it is an inner dynamic of metaphysical think-
ing. Is the postsecular condition just another milestone on the road to 
philosophy’s eventual triumph, or is a postsecular condition the manifes-
tation of something more permanent, e.g., multiple religious faiths, a point 
taken up by Gandhi in the Indian context? Many of Gandhi’s arguments, I 
will show, support Habermas and extend them by analyzing the historical 
transformation of Western civilizations. The postsecular age that Haber-
mas sees today in the advanced capitalist countries was analyzed earlier 
by Gandhi using different categories.
A Dissident Conscience
I focus now on Mahatma Gandhi, one of India’s great political thinkers 
of the twentieth century. In recent years Gandhi’s reputation has been 
growing again as some of his ideas on religion have not only survived 
the passage of time but have taken on a new relevance in the current 
debate on postsecularism, for several reasons.16 Ever since the publica-
tion of “Hindu Swaraj,” Gandhi’s writings have attracted great interest 
and intense controversy.17 As a critique of modernity, his seminal essay 
questioned the belief in progress due to the accomplishments in science 
and technology. A critique of both the mechanistic explanation and tech-
nological instrumental rationality is taken up by Gandhi in his rejection of 
16. See Darrell Fasching, John L. Esposito, and Todd Lewis, eds., Comparative Reli-
gious Ethics (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011).
17. Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne H. Rudolph, Postmodern Gandhi and Other 
Essays: Gandhi in the World and at Home (New Delhi: Oxford UP, 2006), p. 4; Romain 
Rolland, Mahatma Gandhi (Kessinger Publications, 2003).
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Western civilization. Constituting the core of this civilization is the craving 
for material comforts that influences the life of individuals in a way that 
makes them accumulate resources in an unlimited way. In his “My Story 
with Experiments with Truth,” modern science is criticized for denying 
the transcendental dimension of reality and rejecting the trans-temporal, 
divine sources of knowledge and authority.18 He also hints at a reductionist 
methodology, which reduces the higher to the lower, essence to substance, 
and form to matter, and through which modern science seeks to explain 
the former in terms of the latter. This altogether obliterates the qualitative 
dimensions of reality and treats all things as uniform material substance. 
Gandhi, according to Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph, refused to “privilege 
modernism’s commitment to the epistemology of universal truths, objec-
tive knowledge and master narrative.”19
The disparity of judgments about Gandhi’s aims and achievements is 
baffling, but I will avoid going into these. Instead I would spend some time 
on understanding the nature of the divorce of politics from morality, which 
Gandhi found missing in Western civilization: “this civilisation takes note 
neither of morality nor of religion.”20 The problem with maintaining a 
difference or eliminating the tension between Gandhi’s politics and his 
religion, or in viewing them as linked, is that it attributes to him a view that 
relieves the individual of any burden of moral reflection when it comes to 
political obligation and civic duty.
Thomas Pantham, in “Beyond Liberal Democracy: Thinking with 
Mahatma Gandhi,” confronts this problem when he claims that the Gandhian 
project is aimed at resolving a fundamental contradiction in the theory 
and practice of liberal democracy, namely, “the contradiction between the 
affirmation of the freedom of the individual in the so-called private sphere 
of morality and its curtailment in the allegedly amoral or purely technical 
public/political sphere.”21 He argues that both Gandhi and Habermas were 
reacting to the contradictions of the late-capitalist state and its claims to 
democratic legitimacy, which was overlooking participatory democracy. 
18. M. K. Gandhi, An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth (Bos-
ton: Beacon, 1957).
19. Rudolph and Rudolph, Postmodern Gandhi, p. 4.
20. Anthony J. Parel, Gandhi: Hind Swaraj and Other Writings (New Delhi: Founda-
tion Books, 1997), p. 37.
21. Thomas Pantham, “Beyond Liberal Democracy: Thinking with Mahatma Gan-
dhi,” in Thomas Pantham and Kenneth L. Deutsch, eds., Political Thought in Modern India 
(New Delhi: Sage, 1996), pp. 325–46.
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They also shared a critical-emancipatory concern with a revitalized public 
sphere promising a reduction of structural exploitation and violence.
According to Pantham, both Gandhi and Habermas oppose the scienti-
zation of politics, both of them favor the proclamation of a political sphere 
by the people from the technocrats of social power. Habermas criticizes 
the antidemocratic and amoral trend of modern scientific civilization. He 
disapproves of the depoliticization of the mass of the population and the 
decline of the political realm.
While I endorse this interpretation that Habermas addresses the 
dangers about the “political” being transformed into a code of self-main-
taining administrative subsystem, I argue that we now need to revisit this 
parallel in the current scenario by claiming that the postsecular age, which 
Habermas sees today in the advanced capitalist countries, was analyzed 
earlier by Gandhi using different categories. Gandhi is critical of the state 
of “political” that is supposed to be autonomous from or external to the 
rest of social life, as the standards that govern the former are assumed to 
be divorced from private moral standards.
In “The Sarvodaya State,” the dichotomization of social life into the 
public or political and the private are then presented at another plane when 
political is reified into the representative state and the social as conflicting 
interests of the individuals. The latter is the proper sphere for individuals 
to exercise their private judgment and interests: “I look upon an increase in 
the power of the State with the greatest fear, because although while appar-
ently doing good by minimizing exploitation, it does the greatest harm to 
mankind by destroying individuality which lies at the root of all progress.”22
The idea of “sarva dharma sambhava” used by Gandhi implies 
broadly religious coexistence, inter-religious tolerance, and equal respect 
for all religions in society. It is a positive concept of equal treatment of all 
religions in the midst of diversity and takes precedence over hierarchical 
structures in Indian religions. He writes that “God has created different 
faiths just as he has the votaries thereof. How can I even secretly harbour 
the thought that my neighbour’s faith is inferior to mine and wish that he 
should give up his faith and embrace mine? As a true and loyal friend, I 
can only wish and pray that he may live and grow perfect in his own faith. 
In God’s house there are many mansions and they are equally holy.”23
22. M. K. Gandhi, India of my Dreams (Ahmedabad: Navjivan Mudranalaya, 1947), 
p. 70.
23. M. K. Gandhi, Harijan, April 20, 1934.
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From the discussion above, we are in a better position to claim that 
Habermas and Gandhi, from their vantage points, agree that the traditional 
secularization thesis needs to be revisited and hence are in agreement on 
the relevance that religious ideas and ethics have in political debate, in 
three ways. First, an inclusive view of religion as a potential emancipator 
of political and cultural resource emerges, a resource that can open up 
and enhance rather than retard public discourse and that can energize the 
creation of more deliberative and more participative social institutions. 
Second, both claim that universal egalitarianism, from which sprang the 
ideals of freedom and collective life in solidarity, the individual moral-
ity of conscience, human rights, and democracy, is the direct legacy of 
religious ethics of justice and of love. Like Gandhi, Habermas seems to be 
saying that religion is an important source of meaning and a repository of 
some truths, and that religion can preserve and communicate certain truths 
better than philosophy. He believes that “the perspective from which post-
metaphysical thinking approaches religion shifts once secular reason takes 
seriously the shared origin of philosophy and religion.”24 Religion can help 
in sustaining meanings that are threatened with extinction by an instru-
mentalized and trivialized public sphere. Habermas is similar to Gandhi 
in that just as there are certain aesthetic experiences that are beyond the 
power of rational philosophy to make fully transparent, so too are certain 
religious experiences that are beyond the power of rational philosophy to 
articulate and explain. Interestingly while Gandhi believed in the principle 
of “sarva dharma sambhava,” or in the truth and equality of all religions, 
he would argue that “God and Truth are convertible terms, and if anyone 
told me that God was a God of untruth or a God of torture I would decline 
to worship him. Therefore in politics also we have to establish the King-
dom of Heaven.”25 Paradoxically he does not deny that there are different 
religions in the world with different scriptures, texts, and symbols, but he 
believes that they were different roads converging upon one point.
Revisionings of a “Postsecular” Religion?
In reframing the question of secularism as a form of separation that 
makes religion private while making power public, recent scholarship 
has contributed to generating important restatements of the problem of 
secularism. William E. Connolly argues that secularism has narrowed the 
24. Habermas, An Awareness of What Is Missing, p. 17.
25. M. Gandhi, Young India, June 18, 1925.
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horizons of democratic thought within a liberal mind-set. Secular liber-
alism has, by a dogmatic insistence on a single form of public reason, 
failed to engage the rich and contrasting multiplicity of experiences in a 
democratic order. For this he proposes the need for promoting an ethos of 
engagement to open up possibilities in which different faiths can coex-
ist.26 Connolly’s project bears a superficial resemblance to the comparable 
efforts of somewhat earlier writers like Carl Schmitt, who explained that 
“all significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized 
theological concepts,” meaning that religion has always been central to all 
social imaginations.27 Charles Taylor in his recent book makes an argu-
ment about the way secularism’s relation to Christianity, the West, and 
modernity remain contestable.28
In many ways, both Gandhi and Habermas go overboard with certain 
propositions found in these writings on the Enlightenment, and there is a 
clear stamp of modernity in their outlooks. But significant elements of this 
outlook were revised and gradually reconstructed. In his famous speech 
in Frankfurt’s St. Paul’s Church, Habermas evoked the risks of derailing 
modernism.29 He also attempted to turn the controversy between religion 
and philosophy toward a new relationship that was reflected in the con-
versation on the dialectic of secularization he had with Joseph Ratzinger, 
Pope Benedict XVI.
While questioning elements of Western civilization and its contradic-
tions, Gandhi seeks not only to reform it but to transform tradition and to 
reveal the capacity of Hinduism to be self-corrective in order to overcome 
this lacuna. It is Gandhi who acknowledges the need for religion and its 
moral foundations as largely sustaining community bonds and social life. 
Gandhi’s understanding of caste more specifically is based on an accep-
tance of social inequalities of Indian tradition. Unlike Western thinkers, 
Gandhi’s motive was not to subvert his cultural tradition but to reconstruct 
it; hence his instruments of cultural change were not history and science, 
but religion and its associated symbolic forms.30
26. William. E. Connolly, Why I Am Not a Secularist (Minneapolis: Univ. of Min-
nesota Press, 1999), p. 19.
27. Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, 
trans. George Schwab (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), p. 36.
28. Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2007).
29. Discussed in Habermas, An Awareness of What Is Missing, pp. 8–12.
30. Dennis Dalton, Mahatma Gandhi: Nonviolent Power in Action (New York: 
Columbia UP, 1993), p. 45.
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Similarly Habermas is also revisioning the Western tradition not by 
rejecting modernity but by reforming secular reason as a distinct method 
of human understanding by which both religion and modern secularity 
are analyzed, understood, and made amenable to practices. In his earlier 
work secular reason cannot be understood in isolation from the real world 
of politics; it is embedded in power dynamics. Secular reason is being 
employed by the powerful groups of a particular society in order to reach 
an arbitrary consensus, which is later enforced and popularized as rea-
sonable or scientific. So the production of reasonable religion or modern 
secularity depends on the power dynamics of a given society, which is fur-
ther dictated by some elite sections of a society. Although power dynamics 
are not so relevant, now secularization in a postsecular society opens up 
the possibility of unleashing the universal capacity of people to employ 
secular reason. We can conclude that a postsecular imagination then can 
be applied to secularized societies in which religion maintains a public 
influence and relevance, while the certainty that religion will disappear 
due to modernization has lost ground.
I argue that despite such disparate historical contexts, both thinkers 
agree that religion needs to be transformed to some extent in a secular 
state. One minor difference is that for Habermas, within the group of 
experiences that remain opaque to philosophy there is a subset that could 
be described as religious/moral experiences (feelings/intuitions). They 
involve our intuitive responses to moral violations. One such intuition 
involves our obligations to those who have suffered unjustly. Habermas 
claims that we seek worldly means to satisfy a moral intuition specially 
to redeem the souls of past injustice. Gandhi was of the opinion that 
experience, emotion, and intuition are the other aspects of an individual’s 
personality, and these are as important as reason. For Gandhi it is impos-
sible to make separations between rationality and spirituality as rational 
ideas are not the only instrument to find out what is right or wrong and to 
know about truth. Hence faith and belief are the medium through which 
one may seek divinity, but its existence cannot be proved by reason.
Like Habermas, who is drawn into a debate with religious spokesper-
sons, Gandhi also engaged with the religious orthodoxy on untouchability. 
Far from aiming to discover an authoritative truth, he acknowledged that 
human beings “will never all think alike, and we shall see truth in frag-
ments and from different angles of vision. Conscience is not the same 
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thing for all.”31 Gandhi’s basic approach had its obvious advantages, but 
a reformist discourse also had several limitations. He challenged Hindu 
institutions and practices largely on the grounds that they were corrup-
tions of an original Hinduism, and so he could not transcend it or subject 
it to a radical critique. Despite the consistency of Gandhi’s criticisms of 
some traditional aspects of Hinduism, most of his interpreters assume on 
the basis of his publicly expressed appreciation of the varna system that 
he embraced tradition in an uncritical manner.32 However a minority of 
interpreters have been more willing to attribute strong postmodern conno-
tations to Gandhi’s political thinking. Indeed Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph 
have argued that in spite of what Gandhi may have thought, his discussions 
of a hierarchy of moral and political principles agree substantially with the 
rearticulating of political pluralism that is not premised on a homogenous 
nation nor dependent on securing the state as site of citizen allegiance.33
One major difference with Gandhi arises out of Habermas’s argument 
that the West is essentially secular since the Enlightenment, a contention 
that he does not undermine. The postsecular for Habermas provides him 
with a useful analytical device for acknowledging not so much the persis-
tence of religion as the partial failure of enlightenment, a failure that by 
default brings religion back into the secular. Following this, for Habermas, 
the secular falls short of its originally intended destination. The important 
difference is that Habermas still discusses that under some circumstances, 
we might not need religion as a vehicle to express normative truth. But 
while Habermas argues for the translation of religion, for Gandhi no reli-
gion is an essential ideology or practice to be translated or neutralized; 
instead we need to recognize the essential diversity and heterogeneity of 
a religious discourse. We need to question secular modernity that has con-
structed an imaginary universal definition of religion.
Talal Asad poses serious objections to developing concrete conceptu-
alizations of religion as found in Habermas. He argues that in the world 
there is no exact thing that is called religion except “the personal quality 
of faith.” All definitions of religion are the historical product of culturally 
specific discursive processes. Habermas mystifies religion as something 
unique that is linked to fundamentalism, bigotry, or fanaticism. He ignores 
31. Gandhi, Young India, September 23, 1926.
32. Bhikhu C. Parekh, Gandhi’s Political Philosophy: A Critical Examination (Notre 
Dame, IN: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1989).
33. Rudolph and Rudolph, Postmodern Gandhi and Other Essays.
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the temporal sociopolitical conditions that give rise to various types of 
religious fundamentalism, religious extremism, or religious revivalism.34 
Asad’s objections about proposing the idea of religion as embodying an 
autonomous essence reveal the ambiguities in Gandhi’s views as the latter 
often argues that “true religion transcends all faiths and creeds in order to 
establish the universal religion of truth and non-violence.”35 Religion is 
also defined as “obedience to the law of God,” which is anchored in both 
truth and non-violence as sovereign principles of human conduct.36
Conclusion
I began this paper by interrogating the postsecular as signaled by evidence 
of a growing deprivatization of religion as well as by an ethical and affec-
tive life that secularization has been unable to meet in Western societies. 
The idea that religion enjoys high visibility in the public sphere of many 
societies has sparked an intense discussion on the doctrine of secularism. 
I have noted in my analyses of Gandhi and Habermas a common concern 
for addressing state-sponsored secularism and diverse religious communi-
ties in their respective contexts. Whatever the deficiencies may be, both 
question the claim that faith is only a private matter based on historical 
experiences of early modern religious wars in Europe. With regard to the 
postsecular, the analysis seeks to substantiate the thesis that the conceptual 
difference between secularism and postsecularism indicates the crisis of a 
foundationalist paradigm.
Now to turn to the Indian experience of state secularism, the debates 
on religion have arisen in a contradictory and conflicting environment 
where several diverse religious communities coexist. Today in Western 
societies, official recognition of religious communities and their culture 
would mean accepting the immigrant populations and minorities as allies 
in the formation of values and the constitution of their selves. This requires 
subverting the rational-critical debate with religion that has proceeded so 
far on relatively narrow and historically conditioned lines. Many of the 
struggles of the modern world that require an interrogation and scrutiniza-
tion of the “private” are issues of religion that need to be now addressed.
34. Talal Asad, “On Re-reading a Modern Classic: W. C. Smith’s The Meaning and 
End of Religion,” History of Religions 40, no 3 (2001): 206.
35. Asad’s view is not an irrefutable one, but I do not address this here.
36. M. Gandhi, Harijan, August 25, 1940.
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Since the creation of the Constitution, Indians have continued to imag-
ine their nation’s polity as one in which secularism has played a central and 
unique part. However we may understand the conflicts around religion, 
secularism has consistently defined itself as valorizing the concepts of 
equality and diversity under democracy. The Constitution of India concep-
tualizes secularism by raising questions related to religion and anticipates 
many of the current problems in the European context. The recognition of 
group rights for communities in the Indian Constitution allows a coexis-
tence of distinct religious minorities in a diverse society.
Several issues have emerged in the Indian context related to personal 
laws and uniform civil code in the past. The personal laws that govern civil 
matters, such as marriage, divorce, adoption, and inheritance, are highly 
contested at times. Three kinds of challenges emerge for secularism: an 
internal critique of defining tolerance; a social justice critique; and the 
freedom of religion.
Many scholars have criticized the idea of tolerance lying in Gandhi’s 
“sarva dharma sambhava,” meaning equal respect for all. Such an idea 
of secularism based on tolerance, as an attitude of leniency toward dif-
ferent philosophical opinions and religious beliefs, has been criticized. 
Tolerance, even though based on preaching non-interference into one’s 
beliefs, does not actively prevent inequalities nor the “adamant refusal 
to respect someone else’s religion.”37 Some scholars argue that the prin-
ciple of secularism strictly “outside any particular identity was designed to 
allow people to live together in civility.”38 Therefore the secular character 
of the Indian state does not automatically foster the conciliation of diverg-
ing interests or ensure the peaceful coexistence of religious communities. 
Since communal forces rely on rural and marginalized populations, the 
strengthening of secularism can come with economic development, reduc-
tion of unemployment, poverty, and illiteracy. Some go so far as to claim 
that the concept of secularism is derived from the principle of democratic 
equality; “it is a means to limit the power of the (Hindu) majority.”39
In recent years many disadvantaged groups claim that secularism con-
structs and modernizes religious communities, but social justice challenges 
this homogenization by looking at differences within them. Moreover 
37. Rajeev Bhargava, ed., Secularism and Its Critics (New Delhi: Oxford UP, 2007).
38. See Neera Chandhoke, Beyond Secularism: The Rights of Religious Minorities 
(New Delhi: Oxford UP, 2009).
39. Ibid., p. 300.
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by emphasizing external protections the state secularists have neglected 
social, cultural, and economic disadvantages faced by the members within 
respective religious communities. Many view secularism as limited and 
demand that discrimination on the basis of conversion to another religion 
to be redressed as dalits (the oppressed) who converted to Christianity or 
Islam are denied equal status within their religious communities and do 
not get benefits of reservations because they are Christians or Muslim.
As Marc Galanter notes, in the context of India, “the freedom that is a 
principle of the secular state is not ‘freedom for religion’ but ‘freedom for 
religion as it ought to be.’” He explains that “the ultimate argument for the 
secular state then is not to maximise the presently desired freedoms but 
to substitute a new and more appropriate or valuable kind of freedom.”40 
Galanter argues that the “notion of religion as essentially private and 
separate from public life is an equally indefensible dogma to those who 
hold religion to encompass more than doctrine, worship, and private con-
duct but to provide obligatory principles for the ordering of public life.”41 
Secularism cannot be entirely neutral among religions or citizens when 
it separates the basis of allegiance from recognition of private interests, 
which depend in turn upon “choices about the most desirable kind of 
polity, society and personality.”42 Hence the prospects for secularism are 
bleak unless it reinvents itself by creatively engaging with religion. When 
it comes to the issue of extending the sense of obligation to those beyond 
one’s immediate circle, it is not clear that the idea of separation of state 
from religion can have any role at all in implementing the ideals of social 
or distributive justice. Secularism cannot even rise up to the task of con-
fronting religious violence and speak a truly democratic language without 
confronting the received practices and traditions of our society.
40. Marc Galanter, “Secularism, East and West,” in Bhargava, Secularism and its 
Critics, p. 258.
41. Ibid., p. 259.
42. Ibid., p. 266.
